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Public Health and Public Wealth: Social 
Costs as a Basis for Restrictive Policies 
DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT 
Department 0/ History, 
University 0/ Hart/ord 
H ISTORICALLY, THE MOST IMPORTANT RATIONALE for coercive public health measures has been the prevention 
of disease and injury to others. However, as noncommuni-
cable diseases and accidents have assumed increased importance as 
causes of morbidity and mortality, and as the connection between 
noncommunicable diseases and accidents and individual practices such 
as smoking and drinking has become more apparent, a new line of 
argument based on social costs has emerged. My purpose is both to 
describe and evaluate the social-costs argument, to explain why it has 
become so popular, and to show what must be done to make it 
consistent with its own utilitarian criterion. 
Justifying Coercion 
In 1710, a Konigsberg servant girl, Barbara Thutin, violated a local 
public health regulation by appropriating several fomites, or articles 
belonging to plague victims. Shortly thereafter, she and her master 
died of the disease. When officials learned of her transgression, the 
servant girl was exhumed, hanged in her coffin on the gallows, and 
then publicly burned (Nohl, 1961). 
Barbara Thutin's fate is an illustration, admittedly extreme, of the 
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coercive nature of most public health measures. Although society no 
longer resorts to punitive postmortem mutilation, most public health 
measures still entail a sanction, usually a fine or imprisonment. One of 
the first actions taken by New York City's Metropolitan Board of 
Health, for example, was the regulation of noxious odors emanating 
from rendering plants. The plant owners resisted, complaining that 
their "private rights" were being violated, but the board pursued the 
matter in the courts and eventually was able to secure the conviction 
of a prominent violator of the law. The offender was clapped into 
prison for sixty days, and thereafter no open violation of the law was 
noted (New York City, 1866). 
When legislators and public health officials are called upon to justify 
their actions, they usually respond that such measures are a legitimate 
exercise of the police power, the recognized authority of the state to 
preserve the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. The concept of 
police power does not deny the existence of private rights, but it 
subordinates them to the well-being of the community. The invocation 
of the police power is especially compelling in the area of public 
health, since the irresponsible actions of one person may result in the 
sickness, injury, or death of another, or possibly trigger an epidemic 
that threatens the fabric of society itself. It was on this ground that 
New York City sanitarians sought to control miasmas escaping from 
rendering plants; a similar justification (if a different etiology) under-
lies current regulation of kitchens and canneries, the sewerage of cities 
and towns, and even the defecation of urban dogs. The disease-
prevention rationale is also applied to situations where the immediate 
danger is posed only to the individual. The state, for example, might 
require immunization of a citizen returning from a region where 
plague was active. If the citizen protested that he would take his own 
chances, the common-sense reply would be that plague is never an 
individual matter, that the returning citizen, if infected, might transmit 
the disease to others. 
Thus, historically, concern for the health and safety of society at 
large, rather than for protecting the individual from his own folly, has 
served as the primary justification for coercive public health measures. 
This pattern is changing, however, as the old reasoning is being 
supplemented, or in some instances superseded, by a newer and more 
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subtle type of analysis based upon social costs. To understand the 
increasing popularity of the social-costs argument, it is first necessary 
to examine the changing orientation of public health itself. 
Communicable diseases, once the leading causes of death, have 
largely been replaced in developed countries by heart disease, cancer, 
stroke, and accidents. In 1976 these four categories of disease ac-
counted for over 70 percent of all deaths in the United States (De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1978). If further, sig-
nificant progress is to be made in reducing the rates of m:ortality and 
morbidity in developed countries, it will be made in the areas of 
noncommunicable disease and accidents. Broadly speaking, three 
strategies are available: prevention, early detection, and treatment. 
Each strategy has its proponents, but there is a consensus among 
public health professionals, as well as among a growing number of 
physicians, researchers, politicians, and economists, that the best ap-
proach is prevention. Better to reduce exposure to carcinogens, for 
example, than to rely on such drastic and chancy therapies as surgery, 
radiation, and chemotherapy. 
Effective prevention of the leading noncommunicable diseases and 
accidents, however, will inevitably involve changes in individual life-
styles. John Knowles, a physician who was one of the most trenchant 
critics of individual health misbehavior, put the matter thus: 
Prevention of disease means forsaking the bad habits which many 
people enjoy--overeating, too much drinking, taking pills, staying 
up at night, engaging in promiscuous sex, driving too fast, and 
smoking cigarettes-or, put another way, it means doing things 
which require special effort-exercising regularly, going to the 
dentist, practicing contraception, ensuring harmonious family life, 
submitting to screening examinations. (Knowles, 1977:59) 
To urge people to adopt such reforms is one thing; to require them by 
law is quite another. The traditional harm-to-others doctrine, as it is 
generally applied, is inadequate to justify proscription of personal bad 
habits. Consider laws penalizing drivers who do not wear seat belts, or 
bans on alleged consumer carcinogens such as saccharin. What does 
the state say to the irate motorist or diet cola drinker who demands 
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the right to take his own chances? After all, head injuries and bladder 
cancers are not contagious; only the individual's health and safety are 
involved. 
Alternative Lines of Response 
There are many possible rejoinders to such individual objections-
virtually as many, in fact, as there are ethical systems. A Kantian, for ex-
ample, would offer the categorical imperative as a rationale for com-
pliance, while a Thomist would presumably cite Aquinas on the right 
and duty of the ruler to promote the welfare of the community 
(D'Entreves, 1974:79). In practice, however, public health officials are 
not given to consideration of the universal implications of human 
actions, nor are they prone to theological speculation; instead, they 
have consistently justified their regulations on the narrowest and most 
secular of grounds. In liberal democracies, this has meant a growing 
recourse to the quantitative utilitarianism of social-costs analysis; in 
totalitarian societies, officials have tended-when they have bothered 
to justify their decisions at all-to couch their arguments in what I 
would describe as neocameralist terms. 
Cameralism was a philosophy that developed in the seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century Germanic states; akin to mercantilism, it held 
that numerous and healthy subjects were a vital source of the 
monarch's wealth and power. This idea found its culminating expres-
sion in Johann Peter Frank's (1976) A System of Complete Medical Police, 
a six-volume treatise printed at intervals over the years 1779-1819, 
touching on virtually all aspects of human behavior. Writing on such 
concerns as "the maternal duty to suckle and its influence on the 
welfare of the state," Frank completely subordinated the individual to 
society; health was not so much an inalienable right as something one 
pursued, or was forced to pursue, to foster the strength of the ab-
solutist state. Although monarchical governments have largely disap-
peared, cameralist notions have lingered, especially in highly 
nationalistic and totalitarian societies like Nazi Germany. Erich Hesse, 
a German physician, furnished a good example of this type of reason-
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ing in his 1938 book, Die Rausch- und Genussgifte, translated as 
Narcotics and Drug Addiction (Hesse, 1946). He was discussing the 
rationale of compulsory detoxification programs for morphine addicts: 
The justification ... hinges on the question: Has a man the right to 
destroy his own body by poisons? No member of the national 
community has this right. On the contrary, everyone has the obliga-
tion to keep himself fit to the benefit of the community. The 
community, which gives the individual his chance to live and to 
make a living, has every right ... to demand this. (Hesse, 1946:47) 
The terminology has altered somewhat ("national community" re-
places "monarchy"), but in outline the argument is basically the same: 
the state is an organic whole, related to individuals in the way a human 
body is related to its constituent cells. Unhealthy cells mean an un-
healthy body, but this is unthinkable, since the well-being-indeed, 
the very existence of the cells-is inseparable from the fate of the 
body. Put another way, it is difficult to construct a sturdy fasces out of a 
bundle of rotten sticks. This type of neocameralist argument can easily 
serve to justify the most restrictive public health policies, even if no 
direct harm results to others. Saccharin and tobacco are bad for the 
individual and therefore bad for the state; laws compelling the use of 
seat belts and motorcycle helmets can be predicated on similar 
grounds. 
There are, however, serious political and philosophical objections 
to neocameralism. Practically speaking, the United States and many 
European societies are dominated by consumerism and are charac-
terized, in varying degrees, by acquisitive individualism. In a country 
like the United States, where life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness 
are enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, appeals to end 
unhealthy but pleasurable practices on the basis of an abstract doctrine 
of national health are highly unpopular. Beyond the instinctive un-
willingness of individual consumers to heed neocameralist injunc-
tions, there is a sophisticated libertarian tradition, urging, as John 
Stuart Mill wrote in 1859, "that the only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
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physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant" (Mill, 1977:223). Regu-
lation of individual actions that do not cause "perceptible hurt" to 
others, Mill argued, is inevitably disutilitarian; governmental med-
dling hampers the development of personality, checks social progress, 
fosters the tyranny of the majority, and disregards the opinion of the 
one person-the individual himself-who is in the best position to 
know what constitutes his own happiness. Mill did not dispute the 
importance of national strength and well-being, but adopted the issue 
as his own. "The worth of a State, in the long run," he wrote, "is the 
worth of the individuals composing it ... ; a State which dwarfs its 
men, in order that they may be docile instruments in its hands even for 
beneficial purposes [,] will find that with small men no great thing can 
really be accomplished" (Mill, 1977:310). Mill's fear of governmental 
regulation of the minutiae of life has been echoed by any number of 
twentieth-century libertarian thinkers, and has been elaborated in the 
novels of E.!. Zamyatin, George Orwell, Anthony Burgess, and 
others intent on dramatizing the dangers of Big Brother. Mill's argu-
ments have also had a restraining influence on police-power legisla-
tion, at least in the United States; legislators have been reluctant to 
pass, and judges on occasion reluctant to uphold, blatant interference 
with individual activities when no clear injury to others has been 
demonstrated (University 0/ Chicago Law Review, 1970). 
Yet the unpleasant fact remains that millions of Americans are 
smoking, eating, drinking, and drugging themselves to an early death, 
and that significant improvement in the nation's health awaits eradica-
tion or at least reduction of such unhealthy practices. Confronted with 
premature and preventable disease, but aware of the political unac-
ceptability of neocameralist arguments, public health advocates have 
had to turn elsewhere for justification of restrictions on unhealthy 
individual activities. Increasingly they have turned to an analysis of 
social costs. 
The idea of social costs is not new; it can be traced back at least as 
far as Jeremy Bentham, who stressed the need for a hedonic calculus. 
One of Bentham's disciples, the great English sanitarian Edwin Chad-
wick, made repeated use of social costs, and in 1842 even performed a 
rudimentary cost-benefit calculation in his Report on the Sanitary Con-
dition 0/ the Labouring Population o/Great Britain (Chadwick, 1965). In 
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1850 an American physician,].C. Simonds, computed the net cost of 
preventable disease for the city of New Orleans, and in 1873 Max von 
Pettenkofer made a similar estimate for the city of Munich (Sigerist, 
1944). Social costs were also an important part of the celebrated brief 
of Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter in Bunting v. Oregon 
(Frankfurter and Goldmark, 1915), the Supreme Court case testing 
the constitutionality of the ten-hour work day. What is new about the 
social-costs argument is its increasing application to issues of indi-
vidual unhealthiness. Basically, it is an attempt to revive the harm-to-
others doctrine, with an important and strategic twist: indirect mone-
tary effects are substituted for direct health effects. Tobacco smoking, 
for example, is harmful not only to the smoker, but also to those who 
must defray the costs of tobacco-related illness. The smoker who 
develops emphysema or lung cancer accumulates large medical bills, 
most of which are covered by private or government insurance. We all 
pay. As John Knowles (1977:59) put it, "One man's freedom in health 
is another man's shackle in taxes and insurance premiums." Additional 
costs may be generated by disability payments or widows' pensions. 
There are also losses of productivity if, as is likely, the illness results in 
increased absenteeism or premature death (Cooper and Rice, 1976). 
A similar case can be made for stricter control of alcohol, mandatory 
use of seat belts, life jackets, and motorcycle helmets, or banning 
consumer products linked to cancer. In the end, all such arguments 
come down to this: since your unhealthy acts hit the rest of us in our 
pocketbooks, we have a right to pressure you to change. The appeal is 
ultimately to utility; bad habits are penalized in the name of the 
greatest (economic) good for the greatest number-although, ironi-
cally, Mill would have denied the validity of this type of analysis on the 
ground that there are other, unaffordable costs associated with en-
forced conformity. 
The social-costs argument is thus a convenient way of retaining the 
harm-to-others doctrine while attacking activities that involve indi-
vidual risk to health. This is not to imply that the traditional disease-
prevention argument has been abandoned; indeed, both rationales 
often surface in the same controversy. Antismoking forces, when 
advocating no smoking in public places, talk about the harm to the 
other person but, when discussing proposals such as drastically in-
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creased cigarette taxes, shift to the social-costs argument. Similarly, 
antialcohol forces point to the dangers posed by drunk drivers, as well 
as to the costs of treating heart disease, cancer of the esophagus, 
cirrhosis, and other alcohol-related disorders. But in other cases, such 
as the use of seat belts, saccharin, or even skateboards, the argument 
for regulation is generally made on the basis of social costs alone. 
Problems with the Social-Costs Argument 
I offer the foregoing as a historical commentary, a description of the 
way those who formulate and enforce public health policies have 
sought to justify their actions. In the remainder of this essay, however, 
I am concerned with critically evaluating the social-costs argument. 
Although the argument has its merits, particularly at a time when 
medical costs are rapidly increasing, there are several potential prob-
lems to which attention should be drawn. These may be summarized 
as the need to determine net social costs, the difficulty of determining 
net social costs, and the obligation to reduce social costs in the manner 
entailing the least coercion. 
The Need to Determine Net Social Costs 
A common rebuttal to the social-costs argument is that some allegedly 
unhealthy activities also generate economic benefits: tobacco is a cash 
crop, the tobacco industry employs thousands of persons, magazines 
depend heavily on revenues from cigarette advertising, and so forth. 
Moreover, there are certain opportunity costs associated with restric-
tive policies; tobacco farmers, for example, might derive substantially 
less income if they were forced to switch to corn or wheat. These are 
not necessarily fatal objections, but they do suggest that advocates of 
restrictive policies must be able to show that they will reduce the net 
social costs. In the case of tobacco, it must be shown that the savings 
resulting from the contemplated action (irrespective of distributional 
effects) outweigh the economic losses; otherwise, no appeal can be 
made to the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. In 
practice, one finds some cases built on a careful weighing of costs and 
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benefits, and others built only on a recital of social costs (cf. Atkinson 
and Townsend, 1977; Wolfe, 1977). Cases of the second type are 
incomplete and inadequate bases for coercive legislation, insofar as 
they have failed to establish that net harm will result to others. 
The Dtfficulty 0/ Determining Net Social Costs 
In theory, the computation of net social costs is easy enough; one 
totals up costs and savings and then subtracts one sum from the other. 
In reality, however, such analyses are complex, expensive, and often 
incomplete. Two factors complicate the task: the difficulty of accu-
rately assessing health COSts, and the near impossibility of quantifying 
the intangible benefits individuals derive from unhealthy activities. 
Evaluation of the dangers posed by consumer carcinogens furnishes 
an example of the first type of difficulty. Chemicals such as cyclamates 
or food and hair dyes are typically declared carcinogenic on the basis 
of rodent bioassay; that is, if an unusually large number of rats or mice 
develop cancer when fed a steady diet of these substances, the sub-
stances are considered likely human carcinogens. The problem is that 
the rodents receive relatively high doses, and it is difficult to calculate 
exactly what effect prolonged exposure to low doses will have on 
human populations. The task is not impossible; dose-response ex-
trapolation models have been proposed, but these are still controver-
sial Gones and Grendon, 1975; Albert, Train, and Anderson, 1977; 
National Academy of Sciences, 1979). Epidemiologic studies can 
sometimes supplement bioassays, but these are not foolproof, as it is 
difficult to isolate and quantify all relevant variables. Moreover, as the 
saccharin controversy illustrates, epidemiologic findings sometimes 
conflict with the rodent studies (Armstrong et aI., 1976; National 
Academy of Sciences, 1979). In short, whenever a case is made that 
we can save a certain number of lives by banning or restricting a given 
carcinogen, the figures presented must be understood as approxima-
tions, whose accuracy depends on the quantity and quality of the data 
available, as well as on the sophistication of the mathematical models 
used to analyze the data. Finally, even if the exact levels of morbidity 
and mortality associated with a particular carcinogen were known, the 
computation of social costs would still be difficult, since the calcula-
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tion of the value of lost livelihood requires certain tricky assumptions 
about average earnings and the prevailing interest rate (Acton, 1975). 
No existing mathematical model, however, can quantify the satisfac-
tion that people derive from risky activities. Tackle football is a good 
example. Of the 1,200,000 persons who participate in organized 
tackle football each fall in the United States, between 50 and 86 
percent sustain time loss injuries, a remarkable rate that would be 
intolerable in virtually any occupation other than sports. Some of the 
injuries are so serious that the young players are rendered quadri-
plegic; 3 of every 100,000 die (Torg et al., 1977). It might also be 
argued that the economic losses (in equipment sales, stadium receipts, 
television royalties) resulting from a ban on contact football would in 
the long run be made up by the increased popularity of less dangerous 
sports, such as soccer. Thus, on strict social-cost grounds, contact 
football should be forbidden. This argument, of course, neglects the 
whole range of emotional values that players and spectators attach to 
the game. How much is a traditional rivalry worth, or the disappoint-
ment of a fan who has followed a team for years? Every risky activity 
produces some satisfaction: the smoker relaxes after lighting up, the 
drinker experiences heightened confidence, the saccharin user 
satisfies his sweet tooth while congratulating himself for avoiding 
sugar and cutting calories. Are these real and substantial benefits, or 
are they passing sensations, which should be sacrificed in the name of 
social savings? 
Reducing Social Costs while Minimizing Coercion 
There are many different actions or combinations of actions that can 
bring about a reduction of net social costs, but often these actions 
involve a varying degree of curtailment of individual liberty. Of the 
array of proposals to minimize the costs of smoking, there are at least 
three-government-sponsored development of safer cigarettes; vol-
untary, government-subsidized smoking cessation clinics; and the 
education of school children-that involve no appreciable coercion. 
On the next level are policies that restrict the promotion and mer-
chandising of tobacco: banning advertising, forbidding cigarette vend-
ing machines, and sale by prescription only. These proposals are 
David T. Courtwright 
coercive in the sense that they curtail corporate marketing options, 
even, in the case of advertising, options that are arguably protected by 
the First Amendment. But, from the consumer's point of view, rela-
tively little coercion is involved, since purchase is still possible, though 
on less convenient terms. This is not necessarily true of sharply 
increased taxes on tobacco products, a policy that would seriously 
affect both manufacturers and consumers. Many smokers, especially 
the poorer ones, would be forced to restrict consumption or to sac-
rifice other commodities. As Mill (1977:298) succinctly put it, "Every 
increase of cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up 
to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on 
them for gratifying a particular taste." The most drastic measure of all 
would be total prohibition, the state in effect saying that the risks of 
smoking are so great that no one should legally be allowed to take 
them. The point to be made about such policy alternatives is that the 
least coercive combination, consistent with the maximum reduction of 
net social costs, is the most desirable. If, for example, it were to be 
determined that the introduction of safer cigarettes, coupled with 
intensive propaganda in schools and a ban on cigarette vending 
machines, would effect approximately the same savings as a near-
prohibitive tax on tobacco, then the former combination of policies 
would be preferred because it is the least destructive of individual 
liberty. 
U nfortunatel y, there are statutory mandates in the United States 
that push regulatory agencies toward the more drastic alternatives. A 
prime example of this is the Delaney Clause of the 1958 Food 
Additives Amendment to the Pure Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 
The clause, sponsored by Representative James]. Delaney of New 
York, states that" ... no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is 
found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is 
found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety 
of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal" (U.S. House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 1974:13; Kleinfeld, 
1973). Unsafe additives, of course, are not allowed on the market, so 
that human or animal studies linking an additive to cancer theoreti-
cally trigger an automatic ban. In some cases this may be the appro-
priate action, but in others less drastic measures may be in order. As 
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mentioned earlier, the evidence that saccharin causes cancer is con-
tradictory; moreover, some groups, such as the obese and the diabetic, 
may derive benefits from its use-although the amount of benefit 
derived is controversial (cf. Cohen, 1978; Rosenman, 1978; National 
Academy of Sciences, 1979). This would seem to suggest a com-
promise measure, such as sale by prescription only, but the clause 
admits of only one action (proscription) and does not permit the 
assessment of net social costs. By contrast, some laws bearing on toxic 
substances, such as the Clean Air Act, Water Pollution Control Act, 
Safe Drinking Water Act, and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act, permit social-costs analyses; other statutes, such as 
the Toxic Substances Control Act, require them as a matter of course 
(Eskridge, 1978). Whether or not proposed restrictions on a toxic 
substance are evaluated in terms of net social costs is often a matter of 
chance, depending on the language of the law under which the sub-
stance happens to fall. Reform may be on the way; a recent report by 
the National Academy of Sciences (1979), Food Sa/ety Policy: Scientific 
and Societal Considerations, criticizes the existing law as complicated, 
inflexible, and inconsistent, and calls for the weighing of health and 
other benefits as well as the marketing of high-risk additives to 
selected subpopulations, such as diabetics, if circumstances warrant. 
Conclusion 
The harm-to-others doctrine, which has served for centuries as the 
basis for coercive public health measures, has become increasingly 
outmoded as the pattern of disease has shifted in developed countries. 
Today the leading causes of morbidity and mortality-accidents and 
noncommunicable diseases-are related intimately (though by no 
means exclusively) to individual irresponsibility and excess; yet 
grounds for state action are problematic, since, in many cases, only the 
individual's immediate health and well-being are at stake. Some public 
health officials, especially those in totalitarian societies, have re-
sponded by appealing to an abstract doctrine of organic national 
health, in effect reviving the main lines of the cameralist position. In 
Western democracies, however, the tendency has been to fashion a 
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utilitarian rationale based on an analysis of social costs. This approach 
is, I believe, necessary and appropriate, especially in view of the 
enormous financial burden imposed on others by the costs of treating 
chronic disease in the modern welfare state. The problem is that such 
calculations are inherently difficult, and there is always the danger that 
we will be forced to take or to refrain from some action for no 
appreciable benefit. This danger can be minimized, however, if we 
insist that any given social-costs argument must be measured against 
three basic standards. First, does the analysis weigh concomitant eco-
nomic losses? That is, does it compute net social costs? Second, is the 
assessment of risk based on substantial and consistent data, and are the 
models used to calculate reduced mortality and morbidity plausible 
ones? Third, has thought been given to selecting the policy or policies 
that entail the least coercion? Unless a social-costs argument meets 
these criteria, it must be considered incomplete, as there is no way of 
determining whether it is consistent with its implicit maxim, the 
greatest good for the greatest number. 
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